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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
My thesis is about deconstruction of existentialism through visual images, or
more precisely, deconstructive visual representations of existential themes.
The question of human existence has been a primal interest in my work. What is
the meaning of existence? How can I make sense ofman's unique intellectual capacity
to question one's own existence? My concern is not so much about coming up with the
answer, but to have a language to disclose the condition. In the past, my work was
merely the ambiguous expression of the existential feeling without any particular
conceptual foundation. My work is now a manifestation of confrontation with the very
awareness of existence.
In this thesis project, my intention is to explore a more analytical approach to the
representation of the subject, by applying the deconstructionist principle to the
conception ofmy work. The objective of incorporating deconstructive thinking is to
examine the nature of the relationship between the images and their meanings, and to
investigate how the works of art construct and represent their overall concepts. In doing
so, I intend to provide sufficient information on the deconstructonist practice, the
existentialist concerns, and their relations to my work.
CHAPTER 2
DECONSTRUCTION AND ART
Deconstruction was originated by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida in the
late 1960s. Originally it was practiced in philosophical writings and literary criticisms.
However, since then, the practice has spread to the fields of social sciences, architecture,
and the visual arts. Nowadays it is a broadly used (and misused) term and, in some
cases, it has little to do with the original philosophical idea. Although its influence on
the current postmodern culture cannot be denied, there is a certain degree of skepticism
about its real significance.
Commonly, deconstruction seems to be misunderstood by the general public
because its identity is rather intangible and obscured. Part of the reason for this is
caused by Derrida himself, who refuses to define what deconstruction is. In the
interview with Christopher Norris, Derrida states:
Since it is not a system, not a method, it cannot be homogenised. Since it takes the
singularity of every context into account, Deconstruction is different from one
context to another. So I should certainly want to reject the idea that
'Deconstruction' denotes any theory, method or univocal
concept.1
'Jacques Derrida, "Jacques Derrida: In Discussion with Christopher Norris,"
interview by Christopher Norris, in Deconstruction: Omnibus Volume, ed. Andreas
Papadakis, Catherine Cooke, andAndrew Benjamin (London: Academy Editions,
1989), 73.
This does not mean that deconstruction is unknowable. Norris summarizes the
deconstructionist activity as follows:
Deconstruction locates certain crucial oppositions or binary structures ofmeaning
and value that constitute the discourse of 'Western metaphysics'. These include
(among many others) the distinctions between form and content, nature and culture,
thought and perception, essence and accident, mind and body, theory and practice,
male and female, concept andmetaphor, speech and writing etc. A Deconstructive
reading then goes on to show how these terms are inscribed within a systematic
structure of hierarchical privilege, such that one of each pair will always appear to
occupy the sovereign or governing position. The aim is then to demonstrate - by
way of close reading - how this system is undone, so to speak, from within; how the
second or subordinate term in each pair has an equal (maybe a prior) claim to be
treated as a condition ofpossibility for the entire system. Thus writing is regularly
marginalised, denounced or put in its place - a strictly secondary,
'supplementary'
place - by a long line of thinkers in theWestern tradition, from Plato andAristotle
to Rousseau, Husserl, Saussure, Levi-Strauss and the latter-day structuralist human
sciences.2
This type of thinking certainly seems to have an affinity with the postmodern art
world. However, can deconstruction really be applied to the visual arts? Since the
deconstructionist practice is heavily rooted in the questioning of linguistic structure and
reading of texts, its application to the visual arts seems absurd. Here is Derrida's
response:
[TJhe most effective deconstruction, and I have said this often, is one that deals with
the nondiscursive, or with discursive institutions that don't have the form of a
written discourse. . . . Now, because there cannot be anything, and in particular any
art, that isn't textualized in the sense I give to the word
"text"
- which goes beyond
the purely discursive - there is text as soon as deconstruction is engaged in fields
said to be artistic, visual or spatial. There is text because there is always a little
discourse somewhere in the visual arts, and also because even if there is no
HDhristopher Norris, Introduction to "Jacques Derrida: In Discussion with
Christopher
Norris," in Deconstruction: Omnibus Volume. 71.
discourse, the effect of spacing already implies a textualization. . . . Deconstruction
starts with the deconstruction of logocentrism, and thus to want to confine it to
linguistic phenomena is the most suspect of operations.3
So deconstruction can surely take place in the field of visual arts. However, how
can deconstructive art be visually recognized? The word deconstruction has been used
by critics to describe the works of such artists as Marcel Duchamp, Jasper Johns, and
Francis Bacon.4 Some artists such as Francis Bacon, ValerioAdami, and Gerard
Titus-Carmel have talked ofDerrida's influence on their works. Yet the distinction
between deconstructive art and many of the other modern and postmodern arts remains
unclear/
Andrew Benjamin explains this difficulty in specifying a particular work of art as
an instance of deconstruction:
Part of the difficulty with this is trying to locate Deconstruction in an object. . . .
The question of the object returns in another way and it goes back to the point put
to Derrida as to whether or not Deconstruction is something that comes to be
enacted within an object or is a way of reading objects or a way of reading texts.
As is always the case with these things, it's clearly both; the question of enactment
is problematic.6
3Jacques Derrida, "The Spatial Arts: An Interview with Jacques
Derrida,"
interview by Peter Brunette and DavidWills, trans. Laurie Volpe, in Deconstruction
and the Visual Arts, ed. Peter Brunette and DavidWills (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), 14-15.
4Norris, 71.
5David Lodge, "Deconstruction: A Review of the Tate Gallery Symposium,"
in Deconstruction: Omnibus Volume. 89-90.
Andrew Benjamin, "Discussion and
Comments," discussion with Stephen
Bannetal., in De-construction: Omnibus Volume. 76.
GeoffBennington puts it this way, "Deconstruction is not in objects [Ojbjects are
in Deconstruction."7
There is another reason why it is difficult to identify deconstruction in art.
Deconstruction is certainly rebellious against traditional philosophical thinking. Such a
frame ofmind is very similar to the attitudes ofmany contemporary artists who
continuously question the value of established styles and concepts. That explains why,
in art, deconstruction does not appear to be anything distinctively different visually.
Here is Bennington again:
[T]he most traditional philosophical views of art as mimesis, and its most academic
practice, have always necessarily left uneasily open a sense of art as a dangerous
event in which something happens to disturb the integrity of 'nature herself' (and
not just respond to her), somewhere resisting the grasp of concept and commentary,
and through the insufficiency of attempted explanations of this event in terms of
talent, inspiration or genius, something of this deconstructive edge or 'point', as
Derrida says, has always been at work. To this extent, art has always already been
in excess of its concepts, already deconstructive . . . [Deconstruction] is in any
case a provisional and necessarily improper name for the movement one ofwhose
traditional names has been 'art'.8
7Geoff Bennington, "Discussion and
Comments," discussion with Stephen
BannetaL, in Deconstruction: Omnibus Volume. 77.
"Geoff Bennington, "Deconstruction and
Postmodernism," in
Deconstruction: Omnibus Volume. 87.
CHAPTER 3
EXISTENTIALISMAND ART
The question of human existence is the main theme in my work. It seems
inevitable for human beings to face this question. Why do we exist? The question of
existence is disturbing and unsettling. We cannot help but feel anguished because we
are conscious beings.
The philosophy of existentialism offers a very clear view of what the state of
human reality is. The principle of existentialism is that, in the case of human beings,
existence precedes essence. In other words, you have to start with subjectivity. We exist
first, and then, we become something afterward. There is no predetermined human
nature.9 In the words of Jean-Paul Sartre, "Man is nothing else but what he makes of
himself."10 Human beings are free to choose any actions. Consequently, each individual
is totally responsible for his/her own
actions.11
Some ofmy works are simply expressions of various existential feelings. They
are more or less intuitively conceived images rather than deeply analytical, yet, a
'Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Humanism of Existentialism," trans. Bernard
Frechtman, in Essays in Existentialism, with a foreword and edited byWade Baskin
(NewYork: A Citadel Press Book, 1993), 35-36.
Ibid., 36.
"Ibid., 41.
particular existential issue underlies each work. For instance, Existence (fig.l) is about
the contingency of human existence in this world. It represents a man's accidental
appearance and disappearance in a certain space and time. What lies in between his
birth and death is only his freedom of choice in life.
Consciousness (fig.2) is about the nothingness of being. The face in the center
symbolizes aman's reflective consciousness and his realization of self. At the same
time, it is the realization of the emptiness of being as well. So the vast empty space is
actually the reflection of himself. In Sartre's thought, the concept of nothingness is
deeply related to that of being. To understand this, first, you need to understand the
nature of consciousness. Arthur C. Danto explains:
The primary structure of consciousness, the absolute beginning point, as much for
Sartre as for the entire phenomenological school, is that consciousness always is of
something. It is not, so to speak, a pure state, and no one is merely conscious
without there being something of which he is conscious.12
Therefore, since consciousness is invariably conscious of something external,
consciousness itself is a sort of nothingness.13 In other words, as Sartre writes,
"Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being - like a worm."14
Gaze (fig.3) is about an ontological conflict between individuals. It depicts the
mental torment caused by the presence of another consciousness. Sartre points out two
"Arthur C. Danto, "Nothingness: or, Consciousness and Ontology," in Jean-
Paul Sartre (NewYork: The Viking Press, 1975), 43.
13Ibid., 57.
14Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Problem of
Nothingness,"
trans. Hazel E. Barnes,
in Essavs in Existentialism. 107.
basic types of being. The being-for-itself is the type of being which possesses its own
consciousness, such as a human being. The being-in-itself is the one which exists
without consciousness of its own, such as an object. And the being-for-itself can turn
into another type of being, which is called the being-for-others.15 What turns a being-
for-itself to a being-for-others is the gaze of another human being. The look of another
human being makes an individual perceive him/herself as "a possible object for that
look".16 So, in the work Gaze, the face which appears on the surface of the eye is
actually the reflection of the being who is reduced to the state of an object by the look.
The work portrays the loss of his sense of freedom, and the ontological problem of
others.
All three of these works consist of the combination of representational and
abstract elements. The most visually intelligible element through these works is the
image of a face. Certainly it is accessible to viewers because the image is easily
recognizable and it has a certain undisguised symbolic quality. It clearly symbolizes the
awareness of existential problems. Even though the image of a face can evoke a strong
emotional response to which a viewer can possibly relate, the conceptual under current
of each work is not so obvious. Therefore it becomes necessary for the viewer to
interpret the abstract symbols and the other implications in the works to fully perceive
their whole concepts.
15Danto, 41-42.
16Arthur C. Danto, "Shame: or, the Problem ofOther
Minds," in Jean-Paul
Sartre. 121.
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CHAPTER 4
WORKS IN DECONSTRUCTION
One obvious binary relationship which occurs in art is that of image and
meaning. It is a system of signs which is of a social, cultural, or individual creation.
Since artists freely combine various visual images from a social icon to a personal
symbol in their works, how a work of art represents its concept varies from one to
another. The meaning of a certain image is not fixed but also changes according to its
context. Therefore, how a work of art is perceived depends heavily upon each
individual's knowledge of the work and how he/she interprets the visual images. This
does not mean that a work of art is all visual images with hidden meanings. The issue
of title brings up an interesting aspect in art.
The title of a work occupies an ambiguous position in art. It is not a part of the
represented image, yet it is not completely outside of the work either. What it does is to
create a certain condition for the work to be seen in a certain way. In some ofmy
works, the titles play a very significant role.
Purpose (fig.4) can be described as the work which questions the existential
concept of the purpose of being by questioning the purpose of the art object itself. In
other words, the image has no logical relation to its title. So the aim of the work is to
raise the question: "Why is this work called Purpose?". Even though the relationship
9
between the image and its title ormeaning is completely arbitrary, the bullet shaped
bronze piece and its reflective glass base are meant to be perceived as something
meaningful. Certainly, this image has an undeniable serene quality of a meditative or an
absolute state. What the whole work ultimately implies is the purposelessness of human
existence in its very essence.
Certainty (fig.5) uses a play of contradiction to originate the question about the
concept of certainty. The broken circle acts as a contradictory image to its title
Certainty. There is nothing certain about the broken circle because of its
incompleteness. So what is certainty? How can we be certain about anything after all?
The concept of certainty is a man made abstract concept which comes with the problem
of language. The work questions how uncertain certainty is and the certainty ofwhat
we think of human reality.
Freedom (fig.6) is about the freedom ofman. The existential concept of human
freedom reveals the paradoxical aspect of human condition. Sartre writes:
[M]an is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet,
in other respect is free; because, once thrown into the world, he is responsible for
everything he
does.17
In other words, human beings cannot escape from their own freedom. The chained
steel rings and their cold heavy property of the material symbolize this heavy human
condition of being bound to one's own freedom. The image of the work is certainly a
17Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Humanism of
Existentialism,"
trans. Bernard
Frechtman, in Essays in Existentialism. 41.
10
contrast to the ordinary concept of the term freedom. Therefore, the work forces a
viewer to face these two seemingly contrary views and, as a result, to question the
concept of human freedom at its very core.
All three of these works explore the relationships between the images and their
meanings in their own unique ways. The overall concept of each work only comes into
existence within the perceptible difference between the represented object and its
meaning implied by the title. However, these works cannot escape from the polysemous
nature of signs after all, no matter how clearly they are titled or how obviously they are
represented. In the end, everything seems to be same as it was. The works of art
remain silent and ambiguous.
11
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In the past few years, it seems that, consciously or unconsciously, my struggle as
an artist was to attain a certain clarity in my work. I seemed to believe that the idea of a
work could be manifested clearly in a visual image or an art object As a result, I could
not help facing a sort of dilemma between my concept of what art can be and the way
art is. Even though there seems to exist an illusion of art as an intelligible substance
because of its visual status, it is not quite so, as Peter Brunette and DavidWills correctiy
point out, "Artistic expression is never the unmediated manifestation of emotion that it
wants to pretend it is."18
So it goes back to the very basic question of what art is. More than anything,
what I discovered, or rather rediscovered, through this thesis project is that the nature of
art is a heuristic medium. Since art can never escape from the system of signs, works of
art always come with some ambiguity. This ambiguity is precisely what gives a sense of
mystery to a work of art. And the mystery is probably necessary for art, in order to
transcend its maker and its mere objectness.
"Peter Brunette and DavidWills,
"Introduction," in Deconstruction and the
Visual Arts. 4.
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Fig. 2. Consciousness : Bronze, Plywood, and Acrylic Paint, 48"x48"x3"
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Fig. 4. Purpose: Bronze and Glass, 35nx12"x12"
16
Fig. 5. Certainty: Steel, Marble, and Paint,
2-5/8"x13,,x13,,
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